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Abstract
The present paper reviews studies of trade misinvoicing by three organizations. One of them is general in nature and does not
address directly the issue of trade misinvoicing of minerals. One arrives at some conclusions which are difficult to check but
which seem to indicate that misinvoicing is of major importance in African mineral trade. The third arrives at similar conclusions
and contains detailed data that make it possible to check the accuracy of the claims. The review shows that the studies suffer from
important weaknesses: elementary checks of data have not been carried out and any anomaly is considered proof of illicit capital
flows without any further investigation. Thus, while we do not really know much with any certainty about the significance of
misinvoicing in mineral trade, we do know that the published estimates are gross exaggerations. The organizations responsible
for the estimates would be well advised to have future publications peer-reviewed by external reviewers.
Keywords Misinvoicing . Illicit capital flows . Commodity trade .Minerals trade
Introduction
Misinvoicing, where the value of goods is declared as lower or
higher than the normal or market value, may be a very impor-
tant problem in world trade: It is often argued that it is one of
the major means whereby illicit capital flows aiming to avoid
taxes and trade duties occur. It is important to note that the
estimates of trade misinvoicing reported in studies do not rep-
resent actual losses to the economies concerned. The losses, in
the form of forgone tariffs or taxes, are smaller than the gross
value of the flows, although in some cases they could be large
relative to the size of the economy concerned. In countries
with strict capital controls, illicit flows can be associated with
evading capital controls. As argued by Forstater (2016), BThis
can be motivated by concern about financial instability or
predatory government or by a desire to access international
investment and consumption. This should not be conflated
with theft of public money or loss of investment funds.
However, it might be argued that it reduces the stake of elites
in ensuring property rights and development at home.^ Other
effects, such as the impact of capital flows on the exchange
rate, should of course also be taken into account andmay be of
considerable importance at certain points in time.
Estimates of illicit capital flows have traditionally used a
residual method, where the net of capital flows into and out of
a country is compared to the change in the value of total assets.
Apart from statistical and other errors, a mismatch between
the twomay indicate that capital flows have not been declared.
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the extent of
the problem, often finding that it is of impressive size, justi-
fying assertive measures to control and reduce it. In recent
years, attempts have been made to estimate the magnitude of
misinvoicing of trade as an additional vehicle for illicit capital
flows. Some studies have found that such practices result in
massive illicit capital flows.1 Moreover, some studies have
attempted to demonstrate that trade in natural resources is a
particularly important element of the overall phenomenon. In
1 For instance, Global Financial Integrity ( 2017,p. viii) estimates that trade
invoicing accounted for illegal financial flows corresponding to on average
12.4% of developing country trade during the period 2005 to 2014.It should be
noted that, strictly speaking, the loss to governments amounts only to the sum
of taxes and duties that would otherwise have been paid, not the entire
difference between export and import data representing the illicit capital flow.
This paper is dedicated to Marian Radetzki in belated celebration of his
80th birthday. Marian has always been the first to question conventional
wisdom and Baccepted truths^ and has been an example to us all in that
respect. Thanks go to Mehmet Arda for several helpful and clarifying
comments and suggestions.
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the following, a few of the studies on trade misinvoicing,
including two that present significant results for international
trade in minerals, are reviewed in order to assess whether their
results are sufficiently reliable to be used as a basis for public
policy, at the national or intergovernmental level.
Background
It is argued that trade misinvoicing as an instrument of illicit
capital flows mainly takes place as underinvoicing of exports,
whereby less is received and declared for exports than would
normally be the case, and overinvoicing of imports, whereby
more than the normal prices are paid for imports. More com-
plicated manoeuvers are of course possible, for instance,
underinvoicing of imports with the difference between the
price paid and the normal one being paid into overseas ac-
counts. However, several of the attempts to study the problem
have focused on the simpler variations.2 Misinvoicing in the
form of underinvoicing of exports or overinvoicing of imports
may be used to reduce taxable income. Another motive may
be to reduce the imposition of trade duties either at the
exporting or importing end. Finally, trade misinvoicing can
be seen as an avenue of capital flight. Capital flight is a phe-
nomenon that can result in official outflow of capital in re-
sponse to adverse change in political and economic environ-
ment. Therefore, for capital to choose trade misinvoicing to
move money out, the capital controls in place would have to
be sufficiently high. When loose capital controls exist for an
economy, the flight of capital can take place through official
channels. However, with sufficiently stringent controls, capi-
tal may choose to move through the route of misinvoiced trade
(Tandon and Kavita Rao 2017, p. 10). Results by Patnaik et al.
(2010) suggest that trade misinvoicing should be seen as one
element of de facto openness on the capital account:
BEconomic agents who desire capital movements for tradi-
tional reasons such as financial portfolio diversification, bets
on exchange rate movements, are likely to achieve these
movements through trade misinvoicing. To the extent that
misinvoicing is feasible, countries do not have a choice about
embarking on high capital account openness once they have
adopted high current account openness.^
Studies of trade misinvoicing commonly rely on a mirror
analysis of trade data, where the value of exports of a partic-
ular good from country A to country B according to country
A’s export data is compared to the value of imports of the same
good to country B from country A according to country B’s
import data. If the registered value of the exports is signifi-
cantly lower than the value of imports, then underinvoicing of
exports or overinvoicing of imports may have taken place.
The estimates are normally based on either the IMF’s
Direction of Trade Statistics (or DOTS) or the United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade). Since both
use reported national trade data, the differences between them
are normally not significant.
It is important to note that estimates based on mirror anal-
yses of this kind using these data are subject to a number of
discrepancies that have little to do with trade misinvoicing.
Important sources of discrepancies, some particularly relevant
in the case of minerals trade, include the following:
& Unintentional errors in the classification of goods with the
same good being classified differently when exported and
imported, or in the volume or value of goods: Errors are
relatively common in trade statistics. A study on copper
trade based on Comtrade data found approximately 650
records that had to be edited in an aggregated database of
37,000 permutations of reporter and partner regions be-
cause they showed improbably large deviations from the
time series’ trend, not including discrepancies visible in a
mirror analysis (Tercero and Soulier 2016). The number is
less than 2%, which may appear small, but it has to be seen
in conjunction with the 12.4% of total developing country
trade that is subject to trade misinvoicing according to one
estimate (Global Financial Integrity 2017, p. viii).
& Intentional discrepancies in goods classification, for in-
stance, to reduce duties levied at either the export or im-
port end: Such mistakes often constitute a form of tax
evasion but do not necessarily represent illicit capital
flows from developing countries since the trade will be
reported, only under the wrong tariff line and, presumably,
at the same price.3 However, the entire value would be
counted as trade misinvoicing in a mirror trade analysis.
& Recorded export destinations being different from actual
ones because goods are sent to bonded warehouses or
other similar transit points, with the country where the
warehouse is located recorded as destination: This type
of error may be quite important, particularly for minerals,
which are often held in bonded warehouses for extended
periods. Even where the commodity eventually leaves the
warehouse to be registered as imports in the same country,
the delay could lead to exports and imports being reported
as occurring in different years. For instance, metals sent to
London Metal Exchange (LME) warehouses anywhere in
the world may remain there for very long periods of time,
making any determination of final destination and
matching exports and imports to the same trading year
very complicated. Another example is provided by the
2 World Bank Group (2017) provides a good overview of transfer mispricing
as well as other mispricing practices specifically for mining.
3 This type of error may be quite common. The author recalls being told by a
metal trader many years ago how to circumvent export controls for unwrought
copper in a particular country: Byou take a wirebar (the most commonly traded
form of copper at the time, author’s note), bash it with a sledgehammer a
couple of times and then it’s classified as scrap^.
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frequent accumulation of metal stocks, particularly stocks of
iron ore, in Chinese ports. InMay 2017, such iron ore stocks
reached 136 million tonnes, representing about 2 months of
Chinese imports and a value of approximately $8 billion
(Business Insider Australia 2017). The existence of such
stocks may lead to large discrepancies between years.
& Price changes while goods are in transit: For goods that
have spent some time in transit, for instance in bonded
warehouses, price changes may be important. However,
depending on pricing practices, they can also be signifi-
cant for commodities that travel straight from seller to
buyer, for instance, if the seller has hedged the sale by
buying futures or options that allow her to lock in a certain
price and the physical deal is settled at the spot price at the
time of delivery.
& Discrepancies between estimated and actual freight costs:
Export values are reported free on board or fob, while
import values are reported including cost, insurance, and
freight, or cif. Since a mirror trade analysis cannot very
well attempt to estimate representative freight costs for all
goods, a standard markup, usually 10%, is applied to ex-
port values to place them on an equal footing with import
values.While 10%may accurately represent the portion of
import values that is accounted for by freight and insur-
ance for all goods on average, there are good reasons to
believe that the portion is higher for many minerals. For
instance, over the past decade, freight has accounted for
between 15 and 50% of the price of Chinese imports of
iron ore from Brazil and for 5 to 30% of imports from
Australia. Similar proportions apply to other low value
minerals that are commonly shipped in dry bulk carriers.
Overall, the sum of errors may be small compared to over-
all misinvoicing and may offset each other. This is at least
claimed by one of the more authoritative sources of estimates,
Global Financial Integrity (see the BGlobal financial integrity^
section in the following), which states
Some discrepancies in the trade misinvoicing (GER)
and balance of payment leakages (HMN) figures reflect
statistical errors in the reporting that underlies the offi-
cial data. However, such measurement errors are prob-
ably on the decline as the capacity, experience, and
training among developing world customs agencies
and statistical compilers has increased. Any overstate-
ment in illicit flows due to statistical errors is almost
certainly offset by all the other factors that these official
calculations simply cannot capture: bulk cash transfers,
same invoice faking, misinvoicing in services and intan-
gibles, and hawala transactions. It is unlikely that devel-
oping countries accidentally omitted over US$1 trillion
from their economies in 2013. (Global Financial
Integrity 2015, p. 4.)
While the argument is slightly misleading since it appears to
say that even systematic discrepancies are not important be-
cause other larger problems are not reported at all, it is con-
ceivable that the sources of discrepancies are small compared
to overall trade misinvoicing globally. Nevertheless, discrep-
ancies for individual countries or products can be significant,
particularly if they result from systematic differences, for in-
stance, in goods classification, underestimated freight costs or
a large portion of trade going through transit points or bonded
warehouses, rather than recording errors. As has just been
argued, some of the sources of discrepancies are likely to be
more important for minerals than for trade on average.
Conclusions for individual countries or commodities may thus
be inaccurate.
As Forstater (2016) notes,
One further clue that ordinary merchanting and transit
trade involving international hubs may be significant in
generating trade misinvoicing estimates can be seen
from the overall pattern of goods trade reported globally.
While there are significant mismatches between exports
and imports reported by pairs of countries, it is striking
that globally, imports and exports track each other close-
ly, falling within the 10% margin conventionally
allowed for the cost of transport and insurance overall.
Why would bil l ions of dollars of over- and
underinvoicing cancel each other out so neatly each
year, so as to appear invisible? It is hard to imagine
how this would happen if the data mismatches mainly
reflected separate, hidden frauds carried out by disparate
entities to move money across borders….However, this
pattern of over and under invoicing netting out neatly is
consistent with mismatches that would be expected
from merchanting and transit trade along commodity
supply chains.
It is important to underline the difference betweenmisinvoicing
and transfer mispricing.4 By definition, transfer mispricing oc-
curs between related parties, which is not necessarily the case
for trade misinvoicing.5 In the case of transfer mispricing, there
4 The term transfer mispricing is used here rather than transfer pricing, since
the latter term describes a practice that is necessary in all cases of trade between
related parties and that is usually both legal and compliant with established
accounting practices.
5 Transfer mispricing may also amount to misinvoicing, as in a classical case
involving Alusuisse, an aluminum company based in Switzerland, and the
Icelandic government. Alusuisse’s Icelandic smelter, ISAL, obtained its alu-
mina from affiliated mines in Australia. In the early 1980s, however, the
Icelandic government discovered that the internal transfer prices used were
far in excess of what could be justified by the cost of alumina in Australia and
the transportation costs fromAustralia to Iceland. Alusuisse agreed to pay back
taxes to help resolve this matter. (Skúlason and Hayter 1998). The Australian
tax authorities subsequently demanded additional tax payments from
Alusuisse’s Australian subsidiary, Austraswiss, on the grounds that alumina
prices reported to them had been understated (Raw Materials Report 1986).
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is in principle no difference between the export and import
value and only one invoice, but the price used in the invoice
is different from the arm’s length price.
There are few examples of either transfer mispricing or trade
misinvoicing having been clearly documented.6 Readhead
(2016) cites some examples, particularly in individual case
studies underlying her main study,7 and provides an overview
of experiences in a number of African countries, finding that
they face several major challenges in implementing transfer
pricing rules, including lack of regulations, data on comparable
transactions, and appropriate administrative structures, as well
as difficulties accessing taxpayer information from other juris-
dictions. There are, however, few clearly documented cases of
trade misinvoicing or transfer mispricing for minerals, and the
difficulties just describedmay explain why so few examples are
known.
Against the background of scarce concrete evidence of
trade misinvoicing in individual cases, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that researchers and others with an interest in trying to
establish the extent of trade misinvoicing have turned to more
indirect methods. Estimates of illicit capital flows have pro-
vided a starting point for this work. Trade misinvoicing is
believed by many to represent a large portion of such flows.
One of the best known sources of estimates estimates that it
represents 87% of illicit financial outflows from developing
countries (Global Financial Integrity 2017, p. vii).
Studies of trade misinvoicing
Global Financial Integrity
Global Financial Integrity (GFI in the following) is a non-
profit, Washington, DC-based research and advisory organi-
zation, which produces analyses of illicit financial flows, ad-
vises developing country governments on policy solutions,
and promotes transparency measures in the international fi-
nancial system. It publishes a report on illicit financial flows
from developing countries at intervals of about 1 year.
GFI uses one of two procedures to calculate trade
misinvoicing, depending on the availability of bilateral trade data
(Global Financial Integrity 2015, p. 47–48). It uses IMF data.
When bilateral trade data are available for countries, GFI
calculates trade misinvoicing for a particular developing coun-
try by comparing that country’s reported exports to and im-
ports from advanced countries with the corresponding reports
by the advanced countries of imports from and exports to the
developing country. These discrepancies thus reflect trade
misinvoicing for developing countries vis-à-vis the group of
advanced countries only. Next, for each developing country in
the sample, the trade discrepancies are marked up to reflect
trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world by applying a ratio equal to
that country’s trade volume with the world relative to its trade
volume with advanced countries only. Finally, the bilateral
trade misinvoicing estimates are adjusted for entrepôt trade
through Hong Kong, using re-export statistics from the
Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department. Because dis-
aggregated re-exports data are not available for other major
trade entrepôts such as Singapore and Dubai, no similar ad-
justment is made for trade passing through these countries.
When bilateral trade data are not available, the trade dis-
crepancies are calculated in the same way as described above
except that world trade reports must be used in place of the
(presumably more accurate) advanced country trade reports
used in the previous calculation. Other than that, the data are
adjusted in the same way as described above for the bilateral
advanced countries calculation.
A potentially serious problem with GFI’s calculations is
that they assume, when using bilateral data, that developed
country data are correct and implicitly that misinvoicing is
practiced only in developing countries. However, a study
comparing developed and developing countries found a
higher frequency of export misinvoicing by developed coun-
tries than by developing ones (Tandon and Kavita Rao 2017,
p. 4).
GFI arrives at high estimates of trade misinvoicing.
According to its latest report, misinvoicing of developing
country trade represented at least $1756 billion in 2014, or
12.4% of their total trade (Global Financial Integrity 2017,
p. viii).
GFI does not present any sectoral or commodity group
estimates for misinvoicing and no conclusions concerning
such groups can therefore be drawn directly from its estimates.
However, it does represent individual country estimates and
high estimates in the case of, for example, Nigeria, which have
led many to conclude that trade in particular commodities, oil
in the case of Nigeria, accounts for a high portion of
misinvoicing. GFI has, however, changed its approach and
estimates when information pointing to systematic errors for
some commodities has become available. Thus, it states in its
latest report:
Due to bilateral data availability, Zambia and South
Africa…were calculated in our most recent report using
the bilateral advanced economies method. However,
6 One of the more often cited examples of alleged transfer pricing is the case of
the Mopani mine in Zambia. The mine is owned by Glencore, a trading com-
pany, and in a leaked audit report commissioned by the Zambian government,
it was claimed that copper exports had been systematically underpriced (Grant
Thornton and Econ Pöyry 2010). A review of the claims in the audit report
shows that they were at the very least strongly exaggerated and based partly on
misunderstandings (Chamber of Mines of Zambia and ICMM 2014, Annex
C). The Zambian Government took no action against Mopani on the basis of
the audit report.
7 See https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/preventing-
tax-base-erosion-africa-regional-study-transfer-pricing for these case studies.
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irreconcilable issues in the destination reporting of
Zambia’s copper exports and South Africa’s gold ex-
ports distort bilateral estimates of misinvoicing to such
a degree that bilateral estimations of misinvoicing for
these countries are of little practical use. To mitigate this
destination reporting issue, we have decided to treat
these countries as world reporters and apply the world
aggregate method. (Global Financial Integrity 2017, p.
45–46).
The issues concerning South Africa and Zambia will be ad-
dressed in more detail in the BUNCTAD^ section in the
following.
GFI considers its estimates to be conservative. It may very
well be true that real illicit capital flows are as large as or larger
than its estimates. However, we do not know. Moreover, some
of GFI’s assumptions rest on uncertain ground. First, while it
may be true that recording errors in different directions can be
expected to offset each other, systematic discrepancies cannot
be expected to do so. Intentional misclassification of goods
and discrepancies between exporting and importing countries
concerning export destinations due to re-exports are likely to
be two of the most important. The above quotation concerning
South Africa and Zambia makes it clear that GFI’s earlier
estimates of trade misinvoicing for these countries were exag-
gerated. As long as GFI does not provide any insight into its
detailed data, it is not possible to say how common or impor-
tant such discrepancies are, unless one repeats the entire exer-
cise in order to identify possible sources of systematic errors.
African Union/United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa
The 4th Joint African Union Commission/United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (AUC/ECA) Conference
of African Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Economic
Development was held in 2011. This Conference mandated
ECA to establish the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial
Flows from Africa. In 2015, the Panel, which was chaired
by former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, published
its report.
The AU/ECA report, which only analyzes African trade,
uses a slightly different method from the GFI. First, it uses
Comtrade data instead of the IMF statistics, which allows it to
access more detailed data (six-digit level in the Harmonized
System). Second, it Bnets off^ the estimates—that is, its esti-
mates are the difference between the trade mispricing illicit
financial flows in the two directions for a given pair of coun-
tries for a given product, while GFI disregards inflows that is.
Third, to calculate the cost of insurance and freight, an econo-
metric model estimating transport costs is used to assess cif
values and mirror flows at fob prices, while GFI uses a fixed
cif/fob ratio of 1.1 for assessing the value of cif. Fourth, ad
valorem equivalents are used to represent the time to trade
across borders (African Union and United Nations
Economic Commission of Africa 2015, p. 95). These differ-
ences mean that in principle, the AU/ECA estimates should be
somewhat more accurate than the GFI ones, although their
incidence is likely to be almost negligible, except possibly
for the use of a model to estimate transport costs, where it is
difficult to assess the importance without having seen the
model.
The AU/ECA estimates for trade mispricing for Africa are
higher than the GFI ones although of the same order of mag-
nitude, at $242 billion for the 2000–2008 period, compared to
$162 billion for GFI. More interesting for the purposes of this
paper, AU/ECA provides a breakdown by commodity groups
at the two-digit level of the Harmonized System. During the
period 2000–2010, the three most important categories were
(African Union and United Nations Economic Commission of
Africa 2015, Table AIII.4) as follows:
1. Oil (HS 27) $83.4 billion
2. Precious metals (HS 71) $57.2 billion
3. Ores (HS 26) $15.2 billion
Copper (HS 74) with $12.2 billion and iron and steel (HS
72) with $10.9 billion were in sixth and seventh place, respec-
tively. These five groups accounted together for $179 billion,
or 56% of the total estimated trade misinvoicing for African
countries.
The report also provides some individual country data, al-
though not in sufficient detail to allow an analysis of the pos-
sible reasons underlying the reported instances of
misinvoicing. Thus, it mentions that in precious metals and
minerals, iron and steel, and ores, the greatest shares in total
illicit capital flows due to trade misinvoicing from Africa are
from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), with
97.6, 59.7, and 51.8%, respectively. Zambia accounts for
65% of misinvoicing in copper (African Union and United
Nations Economic Commission of Africa 2015, p. 97). In all
these cases, exports are found to be underinvoiced. It is some-
what surprising that only one or two countries account for
most of the illicit capital flows due to trade in minerals and
that revenues from such a large portion of exports in these
countries could go missing. A more detailed investigation
would seem to be called for but it is not provided in the report.
The following section will demonstrate that most or all of the
estimated misinvoicing is due to statistical errors.
UNCTAD
In July 2016, on the occasion of the fourteenth UNCTAD
conference, the UNCTAD secretariat presented a study on
trade misinvoicing for commodities (UNCTAD 2016a), with
case studies for five countries: Chile (copper), Côte d’Ivoire
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(cocoa), Nigeria (oil), South Africa (gold, iron ore, silver, and
platinum), and Zambia (copper). The results are similar to the
ones in the AU/ECA report. In particular, very large estimates
of trade misinvoicing are reported for gold exports from South
Africa and copper exports from Zambia. Trade misinvoicing
is also reported for the other commodities and countries, al-
though less important, except for the Nigerian case.
The report concludes that Bthe results show substantial ex-
port misinvoicing − both underinvoicing and overinvoicing –
in all the five countries, with a clear preponderance of export
underinvoicing, except for copper exports from Chile. It is
therefore clear that export misinvoicing could be an important
channel of capital flight from these countries.^ (UNCTAD
2016a, p. 31). It continues to say that
a number of key results emerge at the product level. The
first is the puzzling case of gold exports from South
Africa, where the country’s official statistics report very
little gold exports while substantial amounts appear in
its leading trading partners’ records. This does not ap-
pear to be a simple matter of undervaluation of the quan-
tities of gold exported, but rather a case of pure smug-
gling of gold out of the country. (UNCTAD 2016a, p.
31)
Concerning other countries, it notes that
In Chile, there is systematic and massive export
overinvoicing of copper, while the results for Zambia
show both underinvoicing and overinvoicing of copper
exports. It would be worth investigating the sources of
these differences, in particular, whether these disparities
arise from differences in trade regulation regimes, tax
regimes or capital control regimes between the two
countries. (UNCTAD 2016a, p. 31)
The case of Zambia appears to be particularly puzzling to the
authors:
Switzerland and China accounted for an accumulated
$31.8 billion of export overinvoicing and $5.6 billion
of export underinvoicing, respectively. Together, these
trading partners account for 67.7 per cent of Zambia’s
total copper exports…Copper exports to Switzerland
present a peculiar case, as no such exports are recorded
in Switzerland at all. Excluding Switzerland, Zambia
recorded systematic export underinvoicing starting in
2005, with a cumulative $12 billion in export
underinvoicing over the 1995−2014 period. The pecu-
liar feature of trade with Switzerland deserves to be
explored further, especially at a more disaggregated,
company level. It is possible that exports are recorded
as destined to an importer in Switzerland when the
importer does not reside there, as would be the case with
transit trade. Therefore, it would be important to inves-
tigate the effective destination of Zambian copper
marked as exported to Switzerland that never arrives in
that country. (UNCTAD 2016a, p. 16)
The report attracted considerable attention, particularly since it
was presented at a high profile event during the Conference.
The conclusions were rapidly queried. The main reason for
this was that the report differed in one crucial aspect from
other reports on trade misinvoicing: it presented the detailed
data on which the conclusions were based. It was therefore
possible for readers to see how calculations had been made
and to identify any possible errors or misinterpretations of
statistics.
In response to the many critical comments, UNCTAD sub-
sequently produced a second revised report in December 2016
(UNCTAD 2016b). In this report, some of the estimates, par-
ticularly concerning South Africa, were changed and the com-
ments were revised. According to UNCTAD, BThe reactions
to the report also revealed some areas of confusion in the
interpretation of the results and inadequate understanding of
the key concepts used in the analysis.^ (UNCTAD 2016b,
BAccompanying note for the revised version of the Report^
p. 1). It goes on to discuss some of the criticisms and to defend
the original report’s conclusions. In this context, it is stated:
Another possible source of abnormal discrepancies
could be inconsistencies in recording of the origin and
destination of products. While such inconsistencies may
affect trade misinvoicing estimates at the product-
partner level, their effect on estimates of total
misinvoicing at the national level, which are incorporat-
ed in the estimation of capital flight, is likely to be neg-
ligible. (UNCTAD 2016b, BAccompanying note for the
revised version of the Report^ p. 3) and
The issue of transit trade may also be an explanation of
the large discrepancies between exporting and
importing countries’ commodity trade records. In the
context of the much broader issue of transparency, how-
ever, this raises the question of why exports should be
recorded as destined to a country when they are not
shipped to that country. Clearly, if a commodity is just
Btransiting^ in a country, it should not be recorded as an
export to this country. The evidence presented in the
UNCTAD report whereby export commodities end up
not being tracked from the origin to their ultimate des-
tination should be considered as a matter of concern.
This practice undermines the global efforts to ensure a
fair distribution of the gains from trade especially on
behalf of producers in developing countries. UNCTAD
2016b, BAccompanying note for the revised version of
the Report^ p. 3)
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In summary, UNCTAD claims (1) that discrepancies in re-
cording of the origin and destination of products have a neg-
ligible effect on estimates of total misinvoicing and (2) that
transit trade should be considered a matter of concern that
undermines efforts to ensure a fair distribution of the gains
from trade. The validity of the first point will be discussed in
the following. As regards the second point, the claimed effects
of transit trade would need to be backed up with solid evi-
dence in order to be taken seriously. No evidence of the neg-
ative effects is presented, except for the numbers themselves,
which, as will be seen, are erroneous. Since it is stated no-
where in the second version of the report that the reported
misinvoicing was due to errors by the authors, UNCTAD ap-
parently stands by the results. The results as concerns min-
erals8 are discussed in the following.
South Africa
The most controversial result was the alleged smuggling of
gold from South Africa. It appeared incredible that South
African gold production to a value of $78.2 billion could have
been smuggled out of the country between 2000 and 2014
without anybody noticing. A number of companies, industry
associations, and academics questioned the results. Most im-
portantly in the case of South Africa, an independent consult-
ing firm was commissioned by the South African Chamber of
Mines to review the report. It produced a draft report in
November 2016 (Eunomix 2016) and a final report in
June 2017 (Eunomix 2017). In summary, the two reports point
out that (Eunomix 2017, p. 33):
& Until 2010, South Africa reported most of its gold exports
as monetary gold, whereas UNCTAD included only non-
monetary gold in its analysis since monetary gold is not
included in Comtrade data (although it is easily identified
in South African statistics). Many of the importing coun-
tries reported their gold imports from South Africa as non-
monetary gold, which meant that import values for non-
monetary appeared much larger than reported exports.
This factor accounts for the major part of the discrepancy.
& After 2010, the vast majority of South African gold ex-
ports are recorded, but the destination countries are not
reported due to historical practices of South African tax
and customs authorities. Thus, in Comtrade, the 2011–
2014 gold exports are all reflected as Bunallocated^ but
were ignored in the original UNCTAD report.
& South African export statistics exclude non-domestic gold
refined and exported from South Africa. However, the
importing country reports under the same reporting
system will include all gold imported from South Africa,
including substantial amounts of non-domestic gold re-
fined in the refinery in South Africa (few gold producing
countries have domestic refineries). Non-South African
gold mined in other African countries but refined in
South Africa is therefore most likely recorded as South
African gold by importers.
Accordingly, South Africa’s gold exports are in fact much
higher than the numbers the UNCTAD study found in
Comtrade, thus significantly closing the gap UNCTAD ex-
plained by supposed underinvoicing and smuggling.
According to Eunomix, the misinvoicing discrepancy in gold
exports between partner country data and the average across
three alternative domestic data sources shrinks from $78.2
billion to $9.8 billion after allowing for the Bregular^ 10%
discrepancy margin rate (adjustment to eliminate the bias in-
troduced by the difference between fob and cif values) in
terms of UNCTAD’s methodology.
The UNCTAD report also found a very large discrepancy
for silver and platinum for the years 2000 and 2002, with
South African exports according to Comtrade being 97–98%
lower than imports from South Africa by partner countries,
and smaller discrepancies for other years. Anybody who has
used Comtrade data knows that data errors are frequent (see
Tercero and Soulier 2016). Normally an economist or statisti-
cian faced with such large differences in reported trade be-
tween years would be expected to check whether the very
large discrepancies were found also in other alternative data
sources before jumping to the conclusion that misinvoicing
was the reason. Eunomix (2017) presents domestic statistics
that do not exhibit the precipitous fall in exports in 2000 and
2002. In addition, Eunomix presents an explanation for the
smaller discrepancies in other years, where figures are influ-
enced by toll refining of platinum from Zimbabwe in South
Africa (Eunomix 2017, p. 41–42). Yet, even in the second
version of its report, after having seen the conclusions chal-
lenged and having had ample time to verify the results,
UNCTAD maintains that BWith respect to its nine major trad-
ing partners, South Africa saw a cumulative amount of export
underinvoicing of $19 billion over the 15-year period starting
in 2000^ (UNCTAD 2016b, p. 23).
Finally, with respect to iron ore, UNCTAD finds
underinvoicing of exports from 2000 to 2010, particularly to
Japan and the Netherlands, and overinvoicing from 2011 to
2014. In the second version of its report, UNCTAD states with
reference to the underinvoicing of exports to Japan and the
Netherlands BThe large and abnormal discrepancies with these
leading trading partners deserve detailed investigation^
(UNCTAD 2016b, p. 24). There are however simple explana-
tions for these discrepancies that are familiar to anybody with
some knowledge of international iron ore trade. First,
Rotterdam in the Netherlands is a major transit port for iron
8 The results for Nigeria concerning oil and for Côte d’Ivoire concerning
cocoa are not discussed here in order to keep the focus on non-fuel minerals
only.
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ore to the European Union. Accordingly, South African ex-
ports to, for instance, Germany may very well be reported as
exports to the Netherlands since they are offloaded there and
put on barges to Germany. The large variations in both report-
ed exports from South Africa to the Netherlands and the im-
ports to the Netherlands from South Africa, together with the
fact there is no pattern of one being consistently larger than the
other, point to this being the result of reporting errors rather
than misinvoicing. As seen from Fig. 1, declines in Dutch
imports tend to coincide with increases in German imports
and the sum of both countries’ imports from South Africa
varies by less than the individual country imports.
As regards Japan, the standard 10 % correction applied by
UNCTAD for the difference between cif and fob values is too
low since freight rates between South Africa and Japan have
been a much higher portion of the cif price for almost all years
studied.9 It is likely that this factor explains the entire
Bmisinvoicing^ in the case of Japan. Figure 2 shows the freight
rate for iron ore from South Africa to China (which is virtually
the same as the freight rate to Japan) as a portion of the price of
lump ore from Kumba Resources, the largest South African
iron ore producer, fob to Japan. Kumba Resources stopped
making its prices public after 2007. It should be noted that
the price of lump ore, for which the longest time series is
available, was about 50% higher than the price of iron ore
fines during the years concerned. Accordingly, freight rates
were an even higher portion of prices for cheaper qualities
of iron ore.
Finally, as Eunomix points out, South African iron ore
exporters switched to reporting exports cif instead of fob as
of 2011 (Eunomix 2017, p. 44), which probably explains most
or all of the Boverinvoicing^ found by UNCTAD for the pe-
riod 2011–2014. When both exports and imports are reported
on a cif basis, any difference between the two values due to
transport costs disappears. The introduction by UNCTAD of a
Bcorrection factor^ of 10% then results in an apparent
overinvoicing of exports.
Chile
In the case of Chile’s copper exports, the UNCTAD report
finds large amounts of misinvoicing, mainly with respect to
the Netherlands and China. The report offers the following
reasoning:
One of the possible reasons for the extremely large
Bperverse^ (negative) and Bexcessive normal^
(positive) discrepancies in partner by partner data may
be inconsistencies in the recording of the actual destina-
tion of exports...However, so long as Chile’s copper
exports are registered as imports in only one country,
the aggregate values should not be affected. Thus large
estimated discrepancies with respect to the rest of the
world suggest export misinvoicing.
This argument completely overlooks the important role of
transit trade for copper, with ports such as Rotterdam, Hong
Kong, and Singapore acting as transit points for large quanti-
ties of copper. In such cases, total exports and imports do not
necessarily match, since the exporter may report Singapore as
the destination for a shipment that will be transferred to a
Chinese port, while the Chinese importer, knowing that the
copper came from Chile, will report it as such.10 This is par-
ticularly important given the role of the London Metal
Exchange (LME) warehouses in international copper trade.
Fig. 1 Iron ore imports from South Africa to Germany and the
Netherlands, 2003–2012, thousand tonnes. Source: UNCTAD 2013,
Table 29, p. 40
9 Interestingly, variations in the freight rate were larger than variations in the
iron ore price for the period studied. However, freight rates were correlated
with iron ore prices (both being strongly correlated with the growth in Chinese
industrial production and exports).
Fig. 2 Freight rate from South Africa to China for iron ore as a portion of
the price of iron ore from South Africa (Kumba Resources, lump) for
sales to Japan, percent. Sources, UNCTAD 2007, Tables 84 and 85, and
UNCTAD 2013, Tables 92 and 93, calculations by author
10 As earlier mentioned, GFI corrects for the phenomenon as far as Hong
Kong is concerned by using statistics for re-exports from Hong Kong. It is
somewhat surprising, in view of the importance of Hong Kong as a transit port
to China and the availability of data, that UNCTAD chose not to carry out the
same correction.
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There exists more than 600 LME approved warehouses in 40
locations around the world. It is very common for copper
shipments to be put in an LME warehouse before being de-
livered to the final customer. In such a case, the shipment does
not pass through customs and is not reported as imports until it
has been released from the warehouse. In the case of China,
the role of bonded warehouses should also be mentioned
(there are no LME-approved warehouses in China). These
bonded warehouses have from time to time contained massive
quantities of copper, partly because copper in storage has been
used as a convenient collateral for loans.11 In conclusion, it is
very difficult to draw any conclusions from the copper trade
data concerning China. Proof of misinvoicing would have to
rely on investigations of individual cases.
Zambia
UNCTAD finds substantial misinvoicing of copper exports
from Zambia. Large exports are reported as going to
Switzerland, while Bno copper imports are recorded in
Switzerland at all. Excluding Switzerland, Zambia recorded
systematic export underinvoicing starting in 2005, with a cu-
mulative $12 billion in export underinvoicing with its major
trading partners over the 1995−2014 period, and $14.5 billion
relative to the rest of the world (all the trading partners).^
UNCTAD goes on to remark that BIt is possible that exports
are recorded as destined to an importer in Switzerland when
the ultimate importer does not reside there, as would be the
case with transit trade^ (UNCTAD 2016b, p. 15). The actual
explanation has nothing to do with transit trade but reflects the
conditions under which Swiss trading companies operate.
Trading companies based in Switzerland buy copper from
Zambia and sell it, mainly to China. The most important com-
pany is Glencore, which has a subsidiary in Zambia, Mopani,
which is a large copper producer and also toll smelts and
refines copper from other mines. When the copper leaves the
mine, the final destination may not be known and it may be
reported as Switzerland for the sake of convenience. Glencore
operates under the special Swiss legal and tax regime of
merchanting trading companies:
Merchanting is defined as a transaction in which a com-
pany in Switzerland purchases goods from a supplier
abroad and then sells those goods on to a buyer abroad.
As a rule, the goods do not cross the border into Swiss
territory and are, in consequence, not subject to Swiss
customs duties…Merchanting transactions must be re-
ported at the transaction price valuation…Merchanting
traders not only buy and sell commodities, they are also
involved in organising transport in connection with the
transaction, insurance against loss of or damage to the
goods, storage at loading and off-loading terminals, and
verification of the goods. Above all, merchanting traders
must arrange for the financing of their capital-intensive
commodity transactions. In keeping with a revision of
the international standards on international trade in ser-
vices, merchanting transactions will no longer be consid-
ered as trade in services, after the new standards go into
effect (2014), but will be counted as trade in goods.
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2013, Box 1, p. 8.
These circumstances are well known to anybody involved
in commodity trading in Switzerland. That they are unknown
to UNCTAD, which is based in Switzerland andmoreover in a
city, Geneva, that can be described as the world center of
commodity trading, is surprising.12
Conclusions
The reply to the question posed in the title of this paper, that is,
what do we really know about misinvoicing in mineral trade,
must be that while we do not really know much with any
certainty about the significance of misinvoicing in mineral
trade, we do know that the published estimates are gross
exaggerations.
The review of studies by three organizations has shown
that the studies suffer from important weaknesses, apart from
the tendency to picture gross capital flows resulting from trade
misinvoicing as total losses to the economies concerned.
Elementary checks of data have not been carried out and any
discrepancy is considered proof of illicit capital flows without
any further investigation. There are, however, differences be-
tween the studies. The GFI studies are general in nature and do
not directly claim to offer proof of criminal behavior by spe-
cific companies in specific countries, while AU/UNECA and
UNCTAD jump to conclusions on the basis of poorly under-
stood data.
To recapitulate:
The two studies that permit some detailed analysis (AU/
UNECA and UNCTAD) both base their overall numbers al-
most exclusively on major instances of alleged misinvoicing
for South African gold exports and Zambian copper exports.
In the first case, a simple comparison with national South
African statistics would have been sufficient to identify the
differences in commodity classification and dramatically re-
duce the size of the alleged misinvoicing. A slightly more
detailed investigation of circumstances would have revealed
11 For analyses of the importance of bonded warehouses in China, see Tang
and Zhu (2016) and Geman and Scheiber (2017).
12 According to the Geneva Trading and Shipping Association (GTSA), there
are some 400 companies that are directly connectedwith commodity trading in
Geneva, and some 8000 jobs that depend on the commodities industry
(Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2013, p. 10).
Misinvoicing in mineral trade: what do we really know? 85
both further specifics of South African trade reporting and that
the inclusion in import statistics of gold from other countries
refined in South Africa may have influenced figures. In the
second case, that of Zambian copper exports, it would have
been sufficient for UNCTAD to check the facts with Swiss
federal authorities or with any one of hundreds of commodity
traders in Geneva. The AU/UNECA may be excused for their
lack of understanding of trading practices, not having such
direct access to experts.
Consequently, these two cases of alleged trade misinvoicing
can safely be dismissed. This means that the estimates for trade
misinvoicing of minerals have to be drastically revised down-
wards and that very little remains of the total.
The other cases follow a pattern of inability or reluctance to
check basic facts, whether they concern transit trade of copper
and iron ore, toll smelting of platinum or storage of copper in
LME or bonded warehouses.
In conclusion, one would hope that both the Economic
Commission for Africa and UNCTAD have their publications
peer-reviewed by external reviewers in the future. One also
hopes that they will be less quick to jump to conclusions,
particularly when the conclusions in question raise doubts
about the competence or honesty of governments or
companies.
Since exaggerations and misleading conclusions in some
studies do not preclude the possibility that misinvoicing may
be an important problem in minerals trade, it is worth asking
what can be done about it. Research and critical reviews of the
empirical evidence by organizations such as the Natural
Resource Governance Institute, which is active in the field,
will help improve understanding of the importance of the
problem. Work under-way on base erosion and profit shifting
in OECD and elsewhere may be of some help as will strength-
ened capacity of national tax and customs authorities to iden-
tify anomalies in pricing. Much is already being done in this
area by several international and bilateral agencies.
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